Теория игр для экономистов. Вводный курс. Печерский С.Л - 329 стр.

UptoLike

ВУЗ: 

НовГУ | Великий Новгород

Составители: 

Рубрика: 

‹¨²¥° ²³°                                                       329

104. Hardin G. (1968). The Theory of the Commons // Science.
     162. 1243{1248.
105. Harsanyi J.C. (1963). A Simpli ed Bargaining Model for N-
     person cooperative Games // International Economic Re-
     view. 4. 194{220.
106. Harsanyi J.C. (1967). Games with Incomplete Information
     Played by Bayesian Players. Part I, II, III // Management
     Science. 14. 159{182, 320{334, 486{502.
107. Harsanyi J.C. (1973). Games with Randomly Distributed
     Payo s: A New Rationale for Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
     Points // International Journal of Game Theory. 2. 1{23.
108. Hart S. (1985). An Axiomatization of Harsanyi's Non-
     Transferable Utility Solution // Econometrica. 53. N 6.
     1295{1314.
109. Hart S., Mas-Colell A. (1989). Potential, Value and Consis-
     tency // Econometrica. 57. 589{614.
110. Hart S., Mas-Colell A. (1995). Bargaining and Value. Hebrew
     University of Jerusalem. Discussion Paper. N 66. January
     1995.
111. Herrero C., Maschler M., Villar A. (1995). Personal rights
     and collective ownership: the rights-egalitarian solution. Uni-
     versity of Alicante (Mimeo).
112. Ichiishi T. (1993). The Cooperative Nature of the Firm. Cam-
     bridge University Press. (M)
113. Kalai E. (1973). Excess Functions, Nucleolus, Kernel and " -
     Core of Non-Sidepayments Cooperative Games // Technical
     Report. N 12. Department of Statistics. Tel-Aviv University.
114. Kalai E. (1975). Excess Functions for Cooperative Games
     Without Sidepayments // SIAM Journal of Applied Mathe-
     matics. 29. N 1. 60{71.

Страницы