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These major policy changes, in turn, were expected to increase saving and investment, increase economic
growth, balance the budget, restore healthy financial markets, and reduce inflation and interest rates.
Any evaluation of the Reagan economic program should thus address two general questions: "How much
of the proposed policy changes were approved?" "And how much of the expected economic effects were real-
ized?" Reaganomics continues to be a controversial issue. For those who do not view Reaganomics through an
ideological lens, however, one's evaluation of this major change in economic policy will depend on the balance
of the realized economic effects.
President Reagan delivered on each of his four major policy objectives, although not to the extent that he
and his supporters had hoped. The annual increase in real (inflation-adjusted) federal spending declined from
4,0 per cent during the Carter administration to 2,5 per cent during the Reagan administration, despite a record
peacetime increase in real defense spending. This part of Reagan's fiscal record, however, reflected only a mod-
eration, not a reversal, of prior fiscal trends. Reagan made no significant changes to the major transfer payment
programs (such as Social Security and Medicare), and he proposed no substantial reductions in other domestic
programs after his first budget.
Moreover, the growth of defense spending during his first term was higher than Reagan had proposed dur-
ing the 1980 campaign, and since economic growth was somewhat slower than expected, Reagan did not
achieve a significant reduction in federal spending as a per cent of national output. Federal spending was 22,9
per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in fiscal 1981, increased somewhat during the middle years of his
administration, and declined to 22,1 per cent of GDP in fiscal 1989. This part of the Reagan record was proba-
bly the greatest disappointment to his supporters.
The changes to the federal tax code were much more substantial. The top marginal tax rate on individual
income was reduced from 70 per cent to 28 per cent. The corporate income tax rate was reduced from 48 per
cent to 34 per cent. The individual tax brackets were indexed for inflation. And most of the poor were exempted
from the individual income tax. These measures were somewhat offset by several tax increases. An increase in
Social Security tax rates legislated in 1977 but scheduled for the eighties was accelerated slightly. Some excise
tax rates were increased, and some deductions were reduced or eliminated.
More important, there was a major reversal in the tax treatment of business income. A complex package of
investment incentives was approved in 1981 only to be gradually reduced in each subsequent year through
1985. And in 1986 the base for the taxation of business income was substantially broadened, reducing the tax
bias among types of investment but increasing the average effective tax rate on new investment. It is not clear
whether this measure was a net improvement in the tax code. Overall, the combination of lower tax rates and a
broader tax base for both individuals and business reduced the federal revenue share of GDP from 20,2 per cent
in fiscal 1981 to 19,2 per cent in fiscal 1989.
The reduction in economic regulation that started in the Carter administration continued, but at a slower
rate. Reagan eased or eliminated price controls on oil and natural gas, cable TV, long-distance telephone ser-
vice, interstate bus service, and ocean shipping. Banks were allowed to invest in a somewhat broader set of as-
sets, and the scope of the antitrust laws was reduced. The major exception to this pattern was a substantial in-
crease in import barriers. The Reagan administration did not propose changes in the legislation affecting health,
safety, and the environment, but it reduced the number of new regulations under the existing laws. Deregulation
was clearly the lowest priority among the major elements of the Reagan economic program.
Monetary policy was somewhat erratic but, on net, quite successful. Reagan endorsed the reduction in
money growth initiated by the Federal Reserve in late 1979, a policy that led to both the severe 1982 recession
and a large reduction in inflation and interest rates. The administration reversed its position on one dimension
of monetary policy: during the first term, the administration did not intervene in the markets for foreign ex-
change but, beginning in 1985, occasionally intervened with the objective to reduce and then stabilize the for-
eign-exchange value of the dollar.
Most of the effects of these policies were favorable, even if somewhat disappointing compared to what the
administration predicted. Economic growth increased from a 2,8 per cent annual rate in the Carter administra-
tion, but this is misleading because the growth of the working-age population was much slower in the Reagan
years. Real GDP per working-age adult, which had increased at only a 0,8 annual rate during the Carter admini-
stration, increased at a 1,8 per cent rate during the Reagan administration. The increase in productivity growth
was even higher: output per hour in the business sector, which had been roughly constant in the Carter years,
increased at a 1,4 per cent rate in the Reagan years. Productivity in the manufacturing sector increased at a 3,8
per cent annual rate, a record for peacetime.
Most other economic conditions also improved. The unemployment rate declined from 7,0 per cent in 1980
to 5,4 per cent in 1988. The inflation rate declined from 10,4 per cent in 1980 to 4,2 per cent in 1988. The com-
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