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bination of conditions proved that there is no long-run trade-off between the unemployment rate and the infla-
tion rate. Other conditions were more mixed. The rate of new business formation increased sharply, but the rate
of bank failures was the highest since the thirties. Real interest rates increased sharply, but inflation-adjusted
prices of common stocks more than doubled.
The U.S. economy experienced substantial turbulence during the Reagan years despite favorable general
economic conditions. This was the "creative destruction" that is characteristic of a healthy economy. At the end
of the Reagan administration, the U.S. economy had experienced the longest peacetime expansion ever. The
"stagflation" and "malaise" that plagued the U.S. economy from 1973 through 1980 were transformed by the
Reagan economic program into a sustained period of higher growth and lower inflation.
In retrospect the major achievements of Reaganomics were the sharp reductions in marginal tax rates and
in inflation. Moreover, these changes were achieved at a much lower cost than was previously expected. De-
spite the large decline in marginal tax rates, for example, the federal revenue share of GDP declined only
slightly. Similarly, the large reduction in the inflation rate was achieved without any long-term effect on the
unemployment rate. One reason for these achievements was the broad bipartisan support for these measures be-
ginning in the later years of the Carter administration. Reagan's first tax proposal, for example, had previously
been endorsed by the Democratic Congress beginning in 1978, and the general structure of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 was first proposed by two junior Democratic members of Congress in 1982. Similarly, the "monetarist
experiment" to control inflation was initiated in October 1979, following Carter's appointment of Paul Volcker
as a chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. The bipartisan support of these policies permitted Reagan to im-
plement more radical changes than in other areas of economic policy.
Reagan failed to achieve some of the initial goals of his initial program. The federal budget was substan-
tially reallocated – from discretionary domestic spending to defense, entitlements, and interest payments – but
the federal budget share of national output declined only slightly. Both the administration and Congress were
responsible for this outcome. Reagan supported the large increase in defense spending and was unwilling to re-
form the basic entitlement programs, and Congress was unwilling to make further cuts in the discretionary do-
mestic programs. Similarly, neither the administration nor Congress was willing to sustain the momentum for
deregulation or to reform the regulation of health, safety, and the environment.
Reagan left three major adverse legacies at the end of his second term. First, the privately held federal debt
increased from 22,3 per cent of GDP to 38,1 per cent and, despite the record peacetime expansion, the federal
deficit in Reagan's last budget was still 2,9 per cent of GDP. Second, the failure to address the savings and loan
problem early led to an additional debt of about $125 billion. Third, the administration added more trade barri-
ers than any administration since Hoover. The share of U.S. imports subject to some form of trade restraint in-
creased from 12 per cent in 1980 to 23 per cent in 1988.
There was more than enough blame to go around for each of these problems. Reagan resisted tax increases,
and Congress resisted cuts in domestic spending. The administration was slow to acknowledge the savings and
loan problem, and Congress urged forbearance on closing the failing banks. Reagan's rhetoric strongly sup-
ported free trade, but pressure from threatened industries and Congress led to a substantial increase in new trade
restraints. The future of Reaganomics will depend largely on how each of these three adverse legacies is re-
solved. Restraints on spending and regulation would sustain Reaganomics. But increased taxes and a reregula-
tion of domestic and foreign trade would limit Reaganomics to an interesting but temporary experiment in eco-
nomic policy.
The Reagan economic program led to a substantial improvement in economic conditions, but there was no
"Reagan revolution". No major federal programs (other than revenue sharing) and no agencies were abolished.
The political process continues to generate demands for new or expanded programs, but American voters con-
tinue to resist higher taxes to pay for these programs. A broader popular consensus on the appropriate roles of
the federal government, one or more constitutional amendments, and a new generation of political leaders may
be necessary to resolve this inherent conflict in contemporary American politics.
SPATIAL ECONOMICS
By Wolfgang Kasper
Producers and buyers are spread throughout space, and bridging the distances between them is costly. In-
deed, much commercial activity is concerned with "space bridging", and much entrepreneurship is aimed at cut-
ting the costs of transport and communication. The study of how space (distance) affects economic behavior is
called "spatial" economics.
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