Основы теории английского языка. Листунова Е.И. - 33 стр.

      VII.
      Read the following two passages and discuss the difference be-
tween the two points of view on synonymy.
      1. R. Jakobson. Selected Writings.
      In any language instances may occur where two words are syn-
onymous, i. e. semantically coinciding or rather NEARLY coinciding
with each other, while differing in their phonemic constitution (though
cases of total semantic coincidence and unrestricted permutability within
the same code are most uncommon, and often close semantic ap-
proximation is mistaken by students for a complete identity). It is
obvious that as a rule a distinctive feature in any language serves to
differentiate words (or their grammatical constituents) which are
semantically distinct; and, above all, language has no other way to
convey a semantic difference than through the distinctive features.
      2. John Lyons. Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics.
               ‘Total Synonymy’ and ‘Complete Synonymy’
      It is a widely-held view that there are few, if any, ‘real’ syn-
onyms in natural languages. To quote Ullmann: ‘it is almost a truism
that total synonymy is an extremely rare occurrence, a luxury that
language can ill afford’. As argued by Ullmann this view rests upon
two quite distinct criteria: ‘Only those words can be described as
synonymous which can replace each other in any given context
without the slightest change either in cognitive or emotive import’.
The two conditions for ‘total synonymy’ are therefore (I) inter-
changeability in all contexts, and (II) — identity in both cognitive
and emotive import. We will discuss the validity of the distinction
between ‘cognitive’ and ‘emotive’ sense presently. For the moment we
may take it for granted.
      The condition of interchangeability in all contexts reflects the
common assumption that words are never synonymous in any con-
text unless they can occur (and have the same sense) in all contexts.
We have already referred to and rejected this assumption. Like all
sense-relations, synonymy is context-dependent: we will return to
this point. The main objection to the definition of synonymy proposed
by Ullmann (and others) is that it combines two radically different
criteria and prejudges the question of their interdependence. It will be
helpful to introduce a terminological distinction at this point. Granted
the validity of a distinction between ‘cognitive’ and ‘emotive’ sense,

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