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63
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Reflecting changes in the international system, theories of war
have passed through several phases in the course of the past three cen-
turies. After the ending of the wars of religion, about the middle of the
17th century, wars were fought for the interests of individual sover-
eigns and were limited both in their objectives and in their scope. The
art of maneuver became decisive, and analysis of war was couched ac-
cordingly in terms of strategies. The situation changed fundamentally
with the outbreak of the French Revolution, which increased the size of
forces from small professional to large conscript armies and broadened
the objectives of war to the ideals of the revolution, ideals that ap-
pealed to the masses who were subject to conscription. In the relative
order of post-Napoleonic Europe the mainstream of theory returned to
the idea of war as a rational, limited instrument of national policy. This
approach was best articulated by the Prussian military theorist Carl von
Clausewitz in his famous classic On War (1832–37).
World War I, which was «total» in character because it resulted
in the mobilization of entire populations and economies for a prolonged
period of time, did not fit into the Clausewitzian pattern of limited con-
flict, and it led to a renewal of other theories. These no longer regarded
war as a rational instrument of state policy. The theorists held that war,
in its modern, total form, if still conceived as a national state instru-
ment, should be undertaken only if the most vital interests of the state,
touching upon its very survival, are concerned. Otherwise, warfare
serves broad ideologies and not the more narrowly defined interests of
a sovereign or a nation. Like the religious wars of the 17th century, war
becomes part of «grand designs,» such as the rising of the proletariat in
communist eschatology or the Nazi doctrine of a master race.
Some theoreticians have gone even further, denying war any ra-
tional character whatsoever. To them war is a calamity and a social
disaster, whether it is afflicted by one nation upon another or conceived
of as afflicting humanity as a whole. The idea is not new – in the af-
termath of the Napoleonic Wars it was articulated, for example, by Tol-
stoy in the concluding chapter of War and Peace (1865–69). In the sec-
ond half of the 20th century it gained new currency in peace research, a
contemporary form of theorizing that combines analysis of the origins
of warfare with a strong normative element aiming at its prevention.
64
Peace research concentrates on two areas: the analysis of the interna-
tional system and the empirical study of the phenomenon of war.
World War II and the subsequent evolution of weapons of mass
destruction made the task of understanding the nature of war even more
urgent. On the one hand, war has become an intractable social phe-
nomenon, the elimination of which seems to be an essential precondi-
tion for the survival of mankind. On the other hand, the use of war as
an instrument of policy is calculated in an unprecedented manner by
the nuclear superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. War
also remains a stark but rational instrumentality in certain more limited
conflicts, such as those between Israel and the Arab nations. Thinking
about war is, consequently, becoming increasingly more differentiated
because it has to answer questions related to very different types of
conflict.
Clausewitz cogently defines war as a rational instrument of for-
eign policy: «an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to
fulfill our will.» Modern definitions of war, such as «armed conflict
between political units,» generally disregard the narrow, legalistic defi-
nitions characteristic of the 19th century, which limited the concept to
formally declared war between states. Such a definition includes civil
wars but at the same time excludes such phenomena as insurrections,
banditry, or piracy. Finally, war is generally understood to embrace
only armed conflicts on a fairly large scale, usually excluding conflicts
in which fewer than 50,000 combatants are involved.
Copyright © 1994–2001 Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. (3432
символа)
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W
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The international environment within which states and the peo-
ple within them operate is regarded by many theorists as the major fac-
tor determining the occurrence and the nature of wars. War remains
possible as long as individual states seek to ensure self-preservation
and to promote their individual interests and – in the absence of a reli-
able international agency to control the actions of other states – rely on
their own efforts. It is no accident that reforms of the international sys-
tem figure prominently in many prescriptions for the prevention of war.
Whereas the reform of human propensities or of the state is bound to be
EVOLUTION OF THEORIES OF WAR Peace research concentrates on two areas: the analysis of the interna-
tional system and the empirical study of the phenomenon of war.
Reflecting changes in the international system, theories of war
World War II and the subsequent evolution of weapons of mass
have passed through several phases in the course of the past three cen-
destruction made the task of understanding the nature of war even more
turies. After the ending of the wars of religion, about the middle of the
urgent. On the one hand, war has become an intractable social phe-
17th century, wars were fought for the interests of individual sover-
nomenon, the elimination of which seems to be an essential precondi-
eigns and were limited both in their objectives and in their scope. The
tion for the survival of mankind. On the other hand, the use of war as
art of maneuver became decisive, and analysis of war was couched ac-
an instrument of policy is calculated in an unprecedented manner by
cordingly in terms of strategies. The situation changed fundamentally
the nuclear superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. War
with the outbreak of the French Revolution, which increased the size of
also remains a stark but rational instrumentality in certain more limited
forces from small professional to large conscript armies and broadened
conflicts, such as those between Israel and the Arab nations. Thinking
the objectives of war to the ideals of the revolution, ideals that ap-
about war is, consequently, becoming increasingly more differentiated
pealed to the masses who were subject to conscription. In the relative
because it has to answer questions related to very different types of
order of post-Napoleonic Europe the mainstream of theory returned to
conflict.
the idea of war as a rational, limited instrument of national policy. This
Clausewitz cogently defines war as a rational instrument of for-
approach was best articulated by the Prussian military theorist Carl von
eign policy: «an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to
Clausewitz in his famous classic On War (1832–37).
fulfill our will.» Modern definitions of war, such as «armed conflict
World War I, which was «total» in character because it resulted
between political units,» generally disregard the narrow, legalistic defi-
in the mobilization of entire populations and economies for a prolonged
nitions characteristic of the 19th century, which limited the concept to
period of time, did not fit into the Clausewitzian pattern of limited con-
formally declared war between states. Such a definition includes civil
flict, and it led to a renewal of other theories. These no longer regarded
wars but at the same time excludes such phenomena as insurrections,
war as a rational instrument of state policy. The theorists held that war,
banditry, or piracy. Finally, war is generally understood to embrace
in its modern, total form, if still conceived as a national state instru-
only armed conflicts on a fairly large scale, usually excluding conflicts
ment, should be undertaken only if the most vital interests of the state,
in which fewer than 50,000 combatants are involved.
touching upon its very survival, are concerned. Otherwise, warfare
Copyright © 1994–2001 Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. (3432
serves broad ideologies and not the more narrowly defined interests of
символа)
a sovereign or a nation. Like the religious wars of the 17th century, war
becomes part of «grand designs,» such as the rising of the proletariat in
THE CONTROL OF WAR
communist eschatology or the Nazi doctrine of a master race.
Some theoreticians have gone even further, denying war any ra- The international environment within which states and the peo-
tional character whatsoever. To them war is a calamity and a social ple within them operate is regarded by many theorists as the major fac-
disaster, whether it is afflicted by one nation upon another or conceived tor determining the occurrence and the nature of wars. War remains
of as afflicting humanity as a whole. The idea is not new – in the af- possible as long as individual states seek to ensure self-preservation
termath of the Napoleonic Wars it was articulated, for example, by Tol- and to promote their individual interests and – in the absence of a reli-
stoy in the concluding chapter of War and Peace (1865–69). In the sec- able international agency to control the actions of other states – rely on
ond half of the 20th century it gained new currency in peace research, a their own efforts. It is no accident that reforms of the international sys-
contemporary form of theorizing that combines analysis of the origins tem figure prominently in many prescriptions for the prevention of war.
of warfare with a strong normative element aiming at its prevention. Whereas the reform of human propensities or of the state is bound to be
63 64
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